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NOTES
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS-LATERAL SuPPoRT.--One of the most
perplexing doctrines in the law of real property is that which pertains
to the lateral support of land. The general rule in regard to lateral
support is that an owner of land is entitled to have his land remain in
its natural condition, in respect to lateral support from the land of the
adjoining owners. The -basic principle which underlies this rule is one
of the cardinal rules of real property. The maxim from which the doctrine of lateral support emanates is Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.1
"That the rights of one should be so used, as not to impair the rights of
another, is a principle of morals, which from the very remote ages has
been recognized as a maxim of law." 2 The right of lateral support is
a right which is natural to and inherent in the land itself.
Cases involving the precise question of lateral support of. the land
itself are very few but those cases which have been adjudicated in that
respect are worthy of consideration. In the Kentucky case of Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. May 1 it appears that the defendant's predecessor in title had obtained a right of way from the plaintiff's testator. The
land which the plaintiff received was situated adjacent to the right of
way of the defendant. In order to obtain some dirt for the construction

1 See Axyo3n3NG LAmowvERs, 1 C. J. 1212.
2
8

Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio 160, 161, 36 Am. Dec. 82, 83 (1840).
157 Ky. 708, 163 S. W. 1112 (1914).
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of an embankment, the defendant excavated on its right of way. As

a result of such excavation the land of the plaintiff was deprived of
its lateral support. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action for dam-

ages and the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, laying down the
proposition that one of two adjoining landowners has no right to

excavate on his land and in so doing remove the lateral support to
which the neighboring land'is entitled. And in the event that the land

subsides, the one excavating is liable for the resulting damage regardless of whether he was guilty of negligence or intentional or malicious
wrongdoing. The rule laid down in the May case is adhered to in the
New York case of Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson,4 in which the
plaintiff village obtained an injunction restraining the defendant, an
owner of land which abutted a highway in the village, from excavating
sand and clay so near the highway that the lateral support of the
highway was impaired. The court therein asserted: (1) That an adjoining landowner has no right to excavate his premises so as to destroy
the lateral support of the street; and (2) That the law of lateral support operates in favor of a city in regard to its streets and highways.
These cases show that the right of a landowner to have his land remain in its natural state, with respect to lateral support from the
land of the adjoining landowner, is an absolute right at the common
law. This right may be protected by an action for damages or by an
injunctionpreventing the removal of the lateral support. However, there
is sound authority contra to this principle. In the Missouri case of
Gates v. Fulkerson5 the plaintiff owned land in the city of St. Joseph
adjacent to the property owned by the defendant. As a consequence
of divers excavations. by the defendant on this land, the land of the
plaintiff slipped from its natural position, and he brought an action
for damages. The court ruled for the defendant, stating that an owner
making an excavation on his own land is not liable for injury to the
adjacent land unless the excavation is negligently done and if it is
done with proper care the owner of the adjacent land must protect it
from damage. The court was influenced by the contention of the defendant that a frozen water pipe under the -plaintiff's land really caused
the land to collapse.
No doubt the most widely debated phase of the doctrine of lateral
support is whether or not the principles of lateral support should be
applicable to land upon which there are artificial improvements so as
to require lateral support to be given to these improvements. The general rule, in regard to artificial structures and improvements on the
land, is that the natural right to lateral support does not extend to
.4 192 N. Y. 54, 84 N. E. 578 (1908).
5 129 Mo. App. 620, 107 S. W. 1032 (1908).
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buildings or artificial structures which may be erected on the land. 6
This rule is by no means a recent development in the law of lateral
support, but, on the contrary, it is a very ancient principle. The English case of Wilde v. Minsterly,7 decided in 1639, offers credence to the
aforementioned proposition. In regard to that case it is said: "One
reason given for the nonexistence of the right of lateral support in such
cases is that where the complaining party has himself erected buildings
on the margin of his own land he himself is in fault and therefore is not
entitled to recover on the familiar doctrine that he who complains of
the use which another makes of his property must be himself free from
fault." 8
In discussing the question of lateral support of land upon which
there are artificial improvements it would be advisable to briefly state
the possible factual situations. First, there is the situation in which
an adjoining landowner excavated in a careful and proper manner, on
his land and in so doing caused a building on his neighbor's land to
slip. Secondly, we have the question of the liability of a landowner
who excavates on his hand in such a negligent manner that the building and improvements on his neighbor's land collapse and are damaged. Then there is the situation in which the excavation is done with
due care but the land subsides from its own pressure, and the weight
of the structures on it in no way contributes to the subsidence of the
soil. Finally, there is the case in which the excavation is performed with
malicious and improper motives.
A study of the cases, involving injury to buildings on land which
was caused as a result of an excavation on the adjoining land when the
excavation was done with due care, will enable us to observe the respective rights and liabilities in such cases. In the ensuing cases the
artificial improvements on the land were of such character that they
greatly increased the pressure on the land so as to be the sole cause
for subsidence of the land. In the case of Gilmore v. Driscoll9 the
plaintiff owned land upon which there were certain buildings, a fence,
and a few currant bushes. Contiguous to the land of the plaintiff was
the land of the defendant. In excavating on his land, the defendant,
though acting with due and proper care, caused the land of the plaintiff to subside resulting in the collapse of and injury to the structures
and improvements. Although the court allowed the plaintiff small dam8 Moody v. McClelland, 39 Ala. 45, 84 Am. Dec. 770 (1863); White v.
Nassau Trust Co., 168 N. Y. 149, 61 N. E. 169 (1901); Matulys v. Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 201 Pa. St. 70, 50 Atl. 823 (1901); Hemsworth v.
Cushing, 115 Mich. 92, 72 N. W. 1108 (1897).
7 2 Rolle, Abr. 564 (1639).
8 1 TkoiosoN ON Rmn PnopmuR
659.
9 122 Mass. 199, 23 Am. Rep. 312 (1877).
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ages for the injury to his land, it refused to allow him a recovery for
the injury done to the artificial improvements on the land. In so refusing, the court asserted that the right of lateral support is restricted
to the protection of the land in its natural state but such right does
not extend to buildings or other improvements on the land. Proceeding
further, the court stated: "For an injury to buildings, which is unavoidably incident to the depression or slide of the soil on which they
stand, caused -by the excavation of a pit on the adjoining land, an
action can only be maintained when a want of due care or skill, or
positive negligence, has contributed to produce it." In accord with
the principle just laid down is the decision in the case of Moellering v.
Evans.10 There the plaintiff and defendant were the owners of adjacent
tracts of land. On the plaintiff's property were divers artificial improvements. The defendant, desirous of building on his land, commenced to excavate but as a result of his excavation the land of the
plaintiff dropped from its natural position thereby causing the improvements to likewise collapse. Thereupon the plaintiff brought an
action-for the injury done to the improvements. The court denied recovery, laying down the rule that the right to lateral support of land
extends to the land in its natural state, and, in the absence of negligence,
an owner of land, who excavates on his land and in so doing causes the
buildings on the adjacent land to collapse, is not liable for such damage
to the buildings or other artificial improvements. A further consideration of the problem of whether the right of lateral support extends
to artificial improvements leads us to an analysis of the case of Bicah
v. Runde."1 In that case the plaintiff and the defendant were owners of
contiguous tracts of land. Each party had erected a house on his respective piece of land and there was a party wall between the houses.
The defendant severed her house from the party wall but reenforced
the wall and annexed her building to the new party wall. In performing this work the defendant caused bricks to fall through and injure the
interior structure of the plaintiff's house and the defendant's operation
also caused -the plaintiff's building to begin sagging. As a result of
such injury the plaintiff brought an action for damages. The trial court
had ruled in favor of the plaintiff but on appeal the judgment was reversed. The basis for the reversal was that the defendant had employed due care and that the right of lateral support does not extend
to the support of any artificial improvements on the land. In order for
the plaintiff to recover for the damage caused to the building by the
subsidence of the land he would have to show negligence on the part of
the defendant in excavating, or show that there had been malicious conduct on the part of the defendant.
10
11

121 Ind. 195, 22 N. E. 989, 6 L. R. A. 449 (1889).
138 N. Y. S. 413, 78 Misc. 358 (1912).
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The cases just considered establish the rule that where one of two
adjoining landowners excavates on his property and in so doing removes the lateral support of the adjacent property he is not liable at
the common law for the injuries done to the improvements or buildings
due to the subsidence of the contiguous property provided the excavation was performed with due care.
The next phase of the doctrine of lateral support is that which
deals with the situation in which an adjoining landowner excavates
on his land in such a negligent manner that the adjoining land falls
from its own weight and the collapse is not due to the weight of the
artificial improvements on the land. In the Michigan case of Gildersleve v. Hammond 12 the plaintiff owned a piece of land with a building thereon and the land was very sandy and possessed very little power of adhesion. The defendant owned the lot which Was adjacent to
that of the plaintiff, and being desirous of erecting a building on his
property, commenced excavating. Although he was well cognizant of
the nonadhesive power and sandy quality of the plaintiff's land and
aware that it would probably subside in the event of a deep excavation
on the adjoining lands, the defendant nevertheless excavated to a depth
of eight feet. As a result of such excavation the land together with the
appurtenances thereon were removed from their natural position and
were considerably damaged. The plaintiff thereupon brought a suit for
the injury to the building and land. In holding for the plaintiff, the
court laid down the rule that a landowner has the right to excavate
on his land, and in the event the excavation causes injury to the buildings and land of the adjoining landowner the excavator is liable for
both if the excavation was done in a careless and negligent manner.
Adhering to the principles just laid down is the case of Larson v.
Metropolitan Street R. Co.,' s in which the plaintiff owned a piece of
property with a two-story building on it and the defendant company
was the owner of the adjacent piece of land. The defendant, desirous
of erecting an engine house on their property, commenced to excavate.
Since the Missouri land was very sandy and nonadhesive, it was an
established custom among engineers and excavators when excavating
near buildings to do so in sections sixteen feet long and then substitute
a new foundation in each section before opening up another. The defendants, however, ignored the well-known procedure and excavated
in one entire section thereby causing the land of the plaintiff to slip
and the house to likewise subside. In ruling in favor of the plaintiff,
the court was of the opinion and the evidence sustained the opinion,
that the defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to proceed with
12
1

109 Mich. 431, 67 N. W. 519 (1896).
110 Mo. 234, 19 S. W. 416, 16 L. R. A. 330 (1892).
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its work in accordance with the established practice. Proceeding furfier, the court held that an owner of land who excavates on his own
premises near the premise of his neighbor in a careless and negligent
manner, is liable in damages for any injuries to the building of the
adjoining landowner which were the consequences of his negligent
excavation. The foregoing cases just discussed establish the principle
that where a landowner excavates on his land and causes the soil of an
adjacent landowner to fall from its oa pressure and no reasonable
precautions have been taken to protect the neighbor's soil and preserve
it in its natural condition, the person doing the excavating is liable
for the injury to the land and also for the injury to any improvements
on the land. While the subsidence in this class, of cases is not due in
any material degree to the improvements on the land of the adjoining
owner, yet the person doing the excavating is held liable for any resulting injury to the artificial structures on the adjoining land that
subsides. If the subsidence is solely due to the weight of the soil itself and there is no negligence on the part of the person whose excavation caused the subsidence, some courts have held that there is no
liability for an injury to the artificial improvements on the land that
subsides. In the case of Cooper v. Altoona Concrete Construction and
Supply Co.14 the plaintiff owned land which was situated adjacent to
the land of the defendant. In excavating, the defendant caused the
plaintiff's land and also a building on the land to collapse. The court
ruled in favor of the defendant and laid down the rule that an owner
of land making an excavation on his land is not liable for damage to
a building when the building itself did not increase the lateral pressure
and there was no negligence on the part of the excavator.
On the other hand a number of courts have taken the view that a
landowner, by building on his land, has not thereby lost his right to
have his soil supported; and if an excavation on the adjoining land
causes his land to sink and, also, produces an injury to artificial improvements on his land he is entitled to damages for such improvements
when such subsidence cannot be ascribed to the weight and pressure
of the artificial structure. This might be termed the English rule. This
rule is based upon the theory that while a landowner is under no legal
duty to furnish lateral support for the artificial improvements on the
adjoining owner's land, yet if the subsidence is due to no pressure from
the artificial improvements and the excavation is carefully done an
actionable wrong has been committed with respect to the subsidence of
the soil itself and, under the general rule that a wrongdoer must make
compensation in damages for all direct consequences of his wrongdoing,
there is liability, also, for any injury to the artificial structures on the
land. In the Rhode Island case of Prete v. Gray 15 the plaintiff
14

15

231 Pa. St. 557, 80 AtI. 1047 (1911).
41 R. I. 209, 141 At. 609 (1928).
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owned land with a building thereon in the city of Providence. The city,
pursuant to the repairing of a sewer in front of the plaintiff's house,
excavated but in so doing removed the lateral support of the plaintiff's land thereby causing considerable damage to the building. The
plaintiff brought an action to recover for the injury to the building and
the land. In ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the court concluded that
there was no negligence on the part of the municipality in excavating
but held that the removal of the lateral support of the land was the
cause of the subsidence and that the weight of the building in no way
contributed to bring about the collapse of the soil. Proceeding further,
the court said that when the right of lateral support is infringed upon
by the adjoining landowner and the land of his neighbor subsides, the
injured party is entitled to compensation for the direct results of such
a violation of duty including any injury to buildings upon his land
when such injury is due to an interference with the lateral support
and cannot be attributed to the pressure and weight of the building
on the land. In accord with the decision just reviewed is the case of
Riley v. Continuous Rail Joint Co. of America.16 In this case the plaintiff had sold the defendant company a strip of her land which the
defendant needed for the laying of tracks. On the plaintiff's land, which
was adjacent to the property of the defendant, were two frame houses
and a few sheds. The defendant then commenced excavating on its
property, and, as a result, caused the land and improvements of the
plaintiff to subside thereby causing considerable damage to the plaintiff. In defense of the action, which the plaintiff brought, the defendant contended that the artificial improvements on the plaintiff's land
increased the lateral pressure to such an extent that they were really
the cause of the subsidence. The court dismissed the defendant's contention and, in holding for the plaintiff, laid down the principle that
where a landowner removes the lateral support of the adjoining owner's
land and as a result the land and the buildings subside and are damaged, such landowner is liable for the injuries to both the land and
the buildings when the land would have subsided of its own accord.
A much quoted case and one which is in accord with the aforementioned rules is that of Stearns v. City of Richmond, 17 in which the
city, in excavating to lay a street, caused the plaintiff's land and a
building thereon to collapse. The court rendered a decision in favor
of the plaintiff, in an action brought for the injury, and established the
principle that where land, upon which there are artificial improvements
or buildings, subsides by reason of excavation on the adjoining land,
and the artificial improvements or buildings in no way contributed to
16

17

97 N. Y. S. 283, 110 App. Div. 787 (1906).
88 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847 (1892).
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the subsidence, then the injury done to the buildings or artificial improvements may be taken into consideration in awarding damages.
There is a qualification of the general rule that the right of lateral
support does not extend to the artificial improvements on the, land,
and that is where the injury to the buildings or structures is the consequence of an excavation made maliciously on the adjoining land.
A landowner who excavates on his land, and his excavation is performed
with malicious and improper motives, should be liable for the injury
to the adjoining land and the artificial improvements thereon. Apparently there are no decisions involving the question of malice in excavating, but in a few cases there has been obiter 18 to the effect that a
landowner who removes the lateral support of the adjoining land merely to satisfy his ill feeling toward the adjoining landowner, is liable
for the damage done to the land and any artificial improvements thereon.
Howard F. Jeffers.

CONTRACTS---"REQUIREMENTS"

CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY Or OBLI-

GATION.--A not uncommon type of contracts is that wherein one party

agrees to furnish all of a certain commodity needed by the other party
to the contract in his business at a certain price and for a given period
of time. The question of the validity of an accepted offer to furnish
such material as one may need, or require, in one's -business is one that
has occasioned much difficulty in the cases. Perhaps the leading case
in support of the validity of such a contract is 'Wells v. Alexandre.1
In this case the defendants agreed to buy from the plaintiff all of the
coal required for the use of certain steamships, at a given price and
for a stated period of time. The defendants were engaged in the business of operating a steamship line, that is to say, they were engaged in
an established business. In an action to recover damages for the breach
of this contract, the court held the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
It appeared that the defendants had sold the steamers during the time
specified in the contract. The court said this did not terminate the
contract; that according to the provisions of the contract, a discontinuance of the business did not terminate the defendant's obligation.
Two principles are illustrated by this case: (1) An agreement to buy
or sell the reqirements of an established business for a definite period
McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. 3. L. 356, 67 Am. Dec. 49 (1856).
1 130 N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142, 15 L. R. A. 218 (1891).
18
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of time is a sufficient consideration to support a contract; 2 and (2) An
agreement to purchase the requirements of an established business cannot be evaded by a sale of the business, unless the provisions of the
contract admit of such a construction. That is, a termination of the
needs of the business does not terminate the contract.3 The effect of
this decision is that the defendants are not entitled to terminate their
obligation by going out of business, or by transferring the business,
and thus terminating their requirements as a matter of fact.
In Wells v. Alexandre the obligation of the defendants was measured by the requirements of certain named steamers, X., Y., and Z.,not by the requirements of the defendants (buyers) in general in a
business. The result of the holding is that there was an implied promise
on the part of the defendants to continue to purchase the coal normally required by these steamers during the contract period, even
though the defendants sold the steamers. This promise was regarded
as sufficiently definite to be enforceable and to constitute a valid consideration. The general rule, applicable in the class of cases, is that
an accepted offer to furnish or deliver such articles of personal property as shall be required by the established business of the acceptor
during a definite period of time is binding. It contains an implied
agreement of -the acceptor to purchase all the articles that shall be
required in conducting his business during this time from the party
who makes the offer.
Since the requirements of the buyer may decrease or increase as
business conditions fluctuate and be met by the inherent elasticity of
a "requirements" contract, provided the conduct of the buyer is bona
fide, there can be no rational distinction between decreases stopping
short of total extinction and those which do not.4 A very liberal and
equitable interpretation was given in a recent case, 5 where, under a
contract to purchase all requirements from seller, the buyer was left
free to deal with his business as he deemed best, provided his conduct
was bona fide. The contract required the buyer to purchase from seller
all ice cream "required" for buyer's stores. It was held that the contract was not breached where buyer ceased making purchases because
it had become disabled by bankruptcy from further performance under
the contract and its good faith was unquestioned.
2 Southwest Kansas Oil & Gas Co. v. Argus Pipe Line Co., 141 Kan. 287,
39 Pac. (2d) 906 (1935); Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 160 So. 215 (Fla. 1935);
Cantrell v. Knight, 72 S.W. (2d) 196 (Mo. App. 1934); iadik v. Noe, 243
N. W. 180 (Iowa, 1932).
3 Wells v. Alexandre, op. cit. supra note 1; Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 611,
82 N. W. 241, 49 L. R. A. 594 (1900); Diamond Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson &
Co. 35 Fed. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929).
4 Helena Light & Ry. Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 57 Mont. 93, 186
Pac. 702 (1919).

5

In re United Cigar Stores Co., 72 Fed. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924).
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Another distinct type of "requirements" contract, which is almost
universally held to be invalid, is one in which the terms of the contract
are so stated as not to obligate either party to do the acts contemplated.
The defect lies in the lack of mutuality of the contract. A "requirements" contract is said to be mutual where it contains an agreement
to sell on the one side and an agreement to purchase on the other. But
it is not mutual where there is an obligation to purchase but no obligation to sell, or an obligation to sell, but no obligation to purchase.
Such a contract is void for want of mutuality if the quantity to be
delivered is conditional entirely on the will or want of the buyer,6 but
is valid if the quantity is ascertainable otherwise than by the will of
the buyer with reasonable certainty. For example, an accepted offer to
furnish such goods as shall7 be required or consumed by an established
business may be enforced.
The quantity of goods is sometimes fixed in the contract wholly
without reference to a numerical standard.8 The buyer may agree to
take all the seller manufactures, or, more commonly, the seller may
agree to sell such quantity as the buyer requires. If it is wholly optional with one party to a bilateral agreement whether he shall perform or
not there is no legal contract. 9 A promise to buy such a quantity of
goods as the buyer may thereafter order, 10 or to take goods in such
quantities as the buyer "may want," is not sufficient consideration since
the buyer may refrain from buying at his option and without incurring
legal detriment himself or benefitting the other party." Whether the
8 Contra: Golden Cycle Mining Co. v. Rapson Coal Mining Co., 188 Fed.
179 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911) (An agreement by one party to furnish and by the
other party to purchase all the coal of a stated kind which the second party
"may use" in the operation of a mine during a limited time is valid.).
7 Conley Camera Co. v. Multiscope & Film Co., 216 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 8th,
1914). Accord: Golden Cycle Mining Co. v. Rapson Coal Mining Co., op. cit.

supra mote 6; Lima Locomotive & M. Co. v. National Steel C. Co., 155 Fed. 771
11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 713 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); National Furnace Co. v. Keystoie Mfg. Co., 110 Il1. 427 (1884); Warden Coal Washing Co. v. Meyer, 98
Ill. App. 640 (1901); Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N. W.
761 (1901); Grand Prairie Gravel Co. v. Joe B. Wills Co., 188 S. W. 680 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1916).
8 2 WMMusroN oN SALZs 464.
9 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Bagley, 60 Kan. 424, 759 (1899); McCaw

Mfg. Co. v. Felder, 115 Ga. 408, 41 S. E. 664 (1902); Wagner v. J. & G. Meakin,
92 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 5th, 1899); Morrow v. Southern Exp. Co., 101 Ga. 810,
28 S. E. 998 (1897).
10 Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt &Nut Co., 114 Fed. 77, 57
L. R. A. 696 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902). See, also, Buick Motor Co. v. Thompson, 138
Ga. 282, 75 S. E. 354 (1912).
11 Other illustrations may be found in the following cases: Harvester King
Co. v. Mitchell, Lewis & Stayer Co., 89 Fed. 173 (C. C. D. Ore. 1898); Wagner

v. 3. & G. Meakln, op. cit. supra note 9; Ellis v. Dodge Bros., 237 Fed. 860 (D.
C., N. D. Ga. 1916); Schalk Chemical Co. v. R. W. Pridham Co., 48 Cal. App.
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buyer agrees to buy all that he requires, or the seller agrees to sell all
that he produces, the weight of authority is clearly that such contracts
12
are binding.
These distinctions may be more clearly seen in Brawley v. United
States,' in which Justice Bradley stated the following general rules
governing these cases: "Where a contract is made to sell or furnish
certain goods identified by reference to independent circumstances,
such as an entire lot deposited in a certain warehouse, or all that may
be manufactured by the vendor in a certain establishment, or that may
be shipped by his agent or correspondent in certain vessels, and the
quantity is named with the qualification of 'about,' or 'more or less,' or
words of like import, the contract applies to the specific lot; and the
naming of the quantity is not regarded as in the nature of a warranty,
but only as an estimate of the probable amount, in reference to which
good faith is all that is required of the party making it.... But when
no such independent circumstances are referred to, and the engagement is to furnish goods of a certain quality or character to a certain
amount, the quantity specified is material and governs the contract.
words of like import, the contract applies to the specific lot; and the
like, in such cases, is only for the purpose of providing against accidental variations arising from slight and unimportant excesses or deficiencies in number, measure or weight. 14 If, however, the qualifying
words are supplemented by other stipulations or conditions which give
them a broader scope, or a more extensive significancy, then the contract is to be governed by such added stipulations or conditions. As,
App. 431 (1894);
65%4192 Pac. 195 (1920); C. & A. R, R. Co. v. Jones, 53 Ill.
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Bagley, op. cit. supra note 9; Atlantic Pebble Co.
v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 89 N. J. Law 336, 98 At. 410 (1916).
12 Klipstein & Co. v. Allen, 123 Fed. 992 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1903); American
Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co., 1 W. W. Harr. 258, 111 At. 290
(1920); Nat'l Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 I1.427 (1884); Minnesota
Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 160 Ill.85, 43 N. E. 774 (1895); S. B.
Smth & Co. v. R. Morse & Co., 20 La. Ann. 220 (1868); Parks v. Griffith &
Boyd Co., 123 Md. 233, 91 Atl. 581 (1914); Ziehm v. Frank Steil Brewing Co.,
131 Md. 582, 102 Atl. 1005 (1917); Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Broomfield,
180 'Mass. 283, 62 N. E. 367 (1902); Cooper v. Lansing Wheel Co., 94 Mich.

272, 54 N. W. 39 (1892); Hickey v. O'Brien, op. dt. supra note 3; Ames-Brooks
Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 83 Minn. 346, 86 N. W. 344 (1901); Miller v. Leo, 35
App. Div. 589, 55 N. Y. S.165 (1898), affirmed, 165 N. Y. 619, 59 N. E. 1126
(1900); Robertson v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 643 (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1920); Walker
v. Mason, 272 Pa. 315, 116 Adt. 305 (1922).
13 96 U. S. 168 (1877).
14 Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S.188 (1885). See, also: Glecker v. Slavens,
S S. D. 364, 59 N. W. 323 (1894); Weinmann v. Fellman, 162 N. Y. S. 131
(1916); Pierce v. Miller, 107 Neb. 851, 187 N. W. 105 (1923); City of Chicago
v. Galpin, 183 Ill. 399, 55 N. E. 731 (1899); Hills v. Edmund Peycke Co., 14
Cal App. 32, 110 Pac. 1088 (1910); United States v. Republic Bag & Paper Co.,
250 Fed. 79 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1918).

NOTES
if it be agreed to furnish so many bushels of wheat, more or less, according to what the party receiving it shall require for the use of his
mill, then the contract is not governed by the quantity named, nor by
that quantity with slight and unimportant variations, but what the
receiving party shall require for the use of his mill; and the variation
from the quantity named will depend upon his discretion and requirements, so long as he acts in good faith." 15
How strongly the matter of good faith determines the decisions is
strikingly presented in the case of Diamond Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson
Co., 16 where the defendant was to purchase its entire requirements of
the plaintiff for a period of five years. All the negotiations between the
parties were based upon the proposed "continuance" of the contract
for fhe term of five years. The fulfillment of their undertakings necessarily implied such a continuance. The parties in good faith contemplated performance of the covenants requiring the defendant to purchase all its specified supplies from the plaintiff for five years. Implicit
in these negotiations and stipulations was the bona fMe operations by
the defendant of its manufacturing plant for that period. The defendant
did not intend to do otherwise until an unexpected opportunity to make
an advantageous sale presented itself. The contact was held valid and
binding.17
In Cranev. Crane & Co.' s the court distinguishes between a contract
to furnish another 'with such supplies as may be needed during a
specified period of time, or with such commodities as the purchaser
has ready to furnish to others, the quantity in such cases being capable
of at least the approximate estimation when the contract is made, and
an agreement by a wholesale dealer to supply a retailer during a certain
time, at stated prices with so much of a commodity as the purchaser
may require for his trade. The former, in the opinion of the court, is
good; but the latter is not, for the reason that it leaves it practically
optional with the purchaser to increase or diminish his orders with the
rise or fall of prices, as may be most to his advantage and the corresponding disadvantages of the seller. Hence, in the opinion of the
court, there is no mutuality. 19 The line of demarcation between valid
and invalid contracts runs between the requirements of machinery or
15 See, also, Louisville Soap Co. v. Taylor, 279 Fed. 470 (C. C. A. 6th,
1922).
16
17

35 Fed. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929).
Accord: New Eng. Iron Co. v. Gilbert Elev. R. R. Co., 91 N. Y. 153

(1883); Booth v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 74 N. Y. 15 (1878). See, also:
Holtz v. Schmidt, S9 N. Y. 253 (1874); East v. Cayuga Lake Ice Line, 21 N.

Y. S. 887 (1893).
18
19

105 Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901).
See, also, Tarbox v. Gotzian, 20 Minn. 139 (1873)

(The court reasoned

that as the acceptor might go out of business when he pleased, there was no
engagement on his part to "want" any of the goods offered.).
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of an established business, and the wants, desires or requirements of
the tenative vendee; and that because the former are reasonably
certain or may be made so by evidence, while the latter are conditioned
by the will of the tentative vendee alone, and are both uncertain and
20
capable of much variation.
In some cases a distinction has been drawn between contracts in
which the use of the commodity puchased is but an incident to the
carrying on of the business itself, and those in which the purchase and
use of the commodity is the main ,business of the purchaser, holding
that in the latter case an agreement to purchase such an amount as
will be required is invalid. 2 ' T. W. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar
Co. 22 gives an excellent discussion of the distinction: "The books are
full of cases . . . to the effect that a contract binding one party to sell,
and the other to buy, all of the 'requirements' of the latter's established
business as to a given commodity, will be enforced, and this because of
the fact that the ascertainment of such requirement is possible with
sufficient definiteness and certainty; the subject-matter of the contract
being thus rendered certain, in the face of the positive reciprocal obligations complete mutuality is secured, and a breach of either party
can be the basis of relief to him who tenders or has given full performance. As a necessary element of this wholesome conclusion, however, the courts have been forced to indulge in the presumption that
the parties intended that the established business of the purchaser was
to be carried on, substantially as of the time of contract, and that the
purchase and use therein of the commodity forming the subject-matter
of the contract would be but an incidental feature of the carryiig on
of such established business .... It will be observed that the principle
involved, and which is reflected in all the cases [with a few exceptions]
...has to do with a purchase by, and a sale for the use of, an established business, in which, presumably ...the use of the commodity
purchased is but an incident to the carrying on of the business itself,
and because of which fact, therefore, the presumption can be indulged
in that the business will be carried on and the incidental use of the
commodity will continue, substantially as intended by the parties,
entirely irrespective of any rise or fall in the price of the commodity
itself."
20

Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., op. cit. supra

note 10. See, also, Laclede Construction Co. v. Tudor Iron Works, 169 Mo. 137,
69 S. W. 384 (1902).
21 T. W. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 Fed. 278 (D. C., S. D.

Col. 1916). Contra: Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., op. cit.
supra note 12 (A contract for the purchase and sale of the "requirements" of a
coal company engaged in the purchase, use and sale of coal in its business is
valid.). See, also, Hickey v. O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 3.
22

237 Fed. 278, 279, 280 (D. C., S. D. Cal. 1916).

NOTES
28
The obviously harsh rulings in such cases as Wells v. Alexandre
(which is often cited to sustain the proposition that the buyer must
take all the goods that his business, if maintained under substantially
the same conditions as existed at the time the bargain was made

would require), Du Point De Nemours Power Co. v. Scktottman24

(where it was held that the fact that the contract did not in express
terms say that the defendant would continue in business for five years
did not relieve it from performing their mutual intention as indicated
by the express covenants, and in order to do so, it had to continue
in business), and National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co. 25 (where
it was held that a contract to furnish a manufacturing company all the
iron it needed in its business for the ensuing year at a certain price is
binding on the purchaser for what is reasonably required and necessary
for a year's supply in such business), have today been mellowed to
the point where, in most jurisdictions, the courts have made "good
faith" in the terminating of requirements contracts the criterion of their
26
judgments.
As to the validity and mutuality of obligation on both parties to
the requirements contract, practically all the jurisdictions agree that
such contracts are valid and binding.2 7 Such decisions, however, depend
largely on the language of the contract. In almost no instance has it
been held that a contract is valid where the quantity
"required" is
28
conditional entirely on the will or want of the buyer.

James R. Osgood.

28

Op. cit. supra note 1.

24 218 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1914).
25 Op. cit. supra note 7.
26 See In re United Cigar Stores Co., op. cit. supra note 5.
27 Southwest Kansas Oil & Gas Co. v. Argus Pipe Line Co., 141 Kan. 287,
39 Pac. (2d) 906 (1935); Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 160 So. 215 (Fla.
1935); Cantrell v. Knight, 72 S. W. (2d) 196 (No. App. 1934); Ferenczi v.
National. Sulphur Co., 11 N. J. Misc. 262, 166 AUt. 477 (1933); Nassau Supply
Co. v. Ice Service Co., 234 N. Y. S. 656, 226 App. Div. 368 (1929); Imperial
Refining Co. v. Kanotex Refining Co., 29 Fed. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928);

Southwest Dairy Products Co. v. Coffee & Moore, 62 Fed. (2d) 174 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932); Hladik v. Noe, op. cit. supra note 2; Banner Creamery Co. v. Judy,
47 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. App. 1932).
24 See: Cosby-Hodges Milling Co. v. Riley, 149 So. 612 (Ala. 1936); Miller
v. Thomason, 156 So. 773 (Ala. 1924). Contra: Golden Cycle Mining Co. v.

Rapson Coal Mining Co., op. cit. supra note 6.

